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Abstract
This paper studies the role of ethno-linguistic diversity on risky sexual behav-
ior and HIV status of individuals. We compute three di erent measures of
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and show that ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is
positively related to risky sexual behavior and HIV status of individuals. This
e ect, both on risky behavior and HIV status, is stronger for women than for
men. Accordingly, we also ﬁnd a positive association between ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity and being in a discordant couple where the wife is HIV posi-
tive. Our ﬁndings have an implication for prevention policies as it identiﬁes
community level characteristics for implementing anti-HIV/AIDS policies.
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11 Introduction
In 2007 UNAIDS has estimated that over 33 million people are living with HIV/AIDS
and 70% of this amount are concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa. Many studies have
tried to explain why HIV has spread extensively and rapidely in sub-Saharan Africa.
There is a general consensus that primary channel of HIV/AIDS transmission in
Africa is heterosexual sex (Schmid et al., 2004). Indeed, the DHS Comparative
Report of February 2009 states that HIV infection is associated with an increasing
number of lifetime sex-partners, earlier age of sexual debut among women, sex with
non-marital or non-cohabiting partners and alcohol use during last sex.
Based on raw data we learn that the spread of HIV in sub-Saharan countries is het-
erogeneous among regions. One reason might be the presence of other untreated and
sexually transmitted diseases that favor HIV infection1. Another reason might be
circumcision of men that reduces sexually transmitted diseases (Weiss, Quigley, and
Hayes, 2000). There is also a role played by economic activity, for example through
exports, on HIV infection, as emphasized in Oster (2009). However, in contrast to
large number of studies examining individual-level determinants, few studies exam-
ine community characteristics that a ect HIV epidemics.
In sub-Saharan Africa the literature states that there is little response in risky sex-
ual behavior due to HIV epidemics(Stoneburner and Low-Beer, 2004; Bloom et al.,
2000; Williams et al., 2003). However, response in risky behavior is heterogeneous
among di erent individuals based on their socio-economic status like education of
women(De Walque, 2007; Dupas, 2009), future life expectancies and future expected
revenues(Oster, 2007a). To this regard, the most prevalent prevention policy, in
Africa, is the anti-HIV education labeled ABC: Abstain, Be faithful and use Con-
dom. ABC policy has proven to be e ective in Uganda((Green et al., 2006)2 and
1The high rate of HIV transmission in Africa si due to other untreated sexually transmitted
diseases. The di erence in transmission rates is large enough to explain the observed di erence in
prevalence between the United States and Sub-Saharan Africa (Oster 2005).
2However, Oster 2009 have given alternative possible reasons why ABC was claimed to be
e ective in Uganda. She explains that routes of exports have an important role rather than
2it’s being extended to other sub-Saharan countries without, up to now, any clear
evidence of success. Sexual behavior has been one of the major focuses of HIV
prevention e orts and understanding changes or its characteristic should be an im-
portant base for predicting the future path of the epidemic.
The aim of our paper is to analyze the diverse rate of HIV prevalence and the behav-
ioral factors which underpin the disease to give important insights for understanding
and designing e ective HIV prevention policies. We study the relationship between
HIV, risky sexual behavior and ethno-linguistic heterogeneity within regions, a com-
munity based characteristic. The role of heterogeneity, in terms of ethnicity, race
and religion, on social capital and consequently on economic variables has been
discussed in the literature3. It is associated with lower trust among communities
because members of the community have di erent tastes and also because it is harder
to enforce a system of social sanctions. Hence, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity has an
implication on risky sexual behavior, taken as a deviating behavior from social cus-
tom, and therefore on HIV infection. Another possible route stems from information
asymmetry that arises in such communities, due to di erent languages and cultures,
thus implying a lower probability of detecting risky sexual behavior. For our analy-
sis we compute three measures of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity widely used in the
literature: ELF based on the herﬁndahl index, GELF based on a similarity matrix
of ethnicity among couples and the Entropy index.
We use the Demographic and Health Survey datasets that give us the possibility to
link the HIV status of an individual with her ethnic characteristic. We choose four
sub-Saharan countries (Malawi, Cameroon, Kenya and Ethiopia, in order of HIV
prevalence) based on data availability and relevant HIV prevalence. The period
of the survey ranges between 2003 and 2005. There are several advantages of the
DHS: it provides the most accurate estimate of HIV prevalence in the population;
population based educational campaign.
3For example, Alesina and La Ferrara (2000) claim that ethnic, racial and economic hetero-
geneity have a negative impact on social capital and consequently on economic development in the
USA
3individuals are not aware of their status allowing for analysis of the determinants of
HIV; each individual’s HIV status is linked to socio-economic characteristics of the
individuals including their partner.
Recently, Pongou (2009)developped a theory of how community-level ethnic hetero-
geneity determines the formation of sexual networks, and how this, in turn, a ects
the spread of HIV/AIDS. In his paper agents derive utility from sexual relationships
but, similarly to our hypothesis, sexual inﬁdelity is punished if detected by own
partner. When information circulates more easily within ethnic groups than across,
agents tend to choose their partners from di erent groups to hide their inﬁdelity,
due to cross-group anonymity. Hence, in his paper, he emphasizes the role of in-
formation asymmetry on risky sexual behavior and provides an empirical evidence
of his theorethical model. In line with this strand of research, our paper focuses
more on the gender related e ect of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity on HIV status of
individuals, without stressing the exact theoretical mechanisms that lie behind this
association.
To preview our result, ﬁrst, we ﬁnd a positive association between extramarital sex
and ethno-linguistic fractionalization. This positive association holds also on HIV
status of individuals, especially that of women. Second we disentangle the direct
and indirect e ect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on HIV status, through own be-
havior and that of partner, by further analysing the siero-positivity of individuals in
a couple. We ﬁnd a positive relationship between our indicators of ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity and the probability of being in a discordant couple, to which we refer
as a proxy for an objective measurement of e ective extramarital sex. Third, we
ﬁnd a positive impact on discordant couples where the wife is HIV positive and the
husband not. This implies that the e ect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is gender
related.
Our paper contributes in understanding community level characteristics which might
hinder or favor the epidemics. Understanding communities that might be at poten-
4tial risk of HIV reduces costs in terms of prevention policies.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we try to give an outline of the
theory that lies behind our story; Section 3 show our empirical strategy and results.
A sensitivity analysis is conducted in section 4. Finally, some conclusions are laid
o  in section 5.
2 Conceptual Framework
Ethnic fractionalization is believed to have an important role in the political economy
of many countries as it might lead to political instability, poor quality of institutions,
badly designed economic policy and poor economic performance. Several studies
have analyzed the negative relationship between racial or ethnic heterogeneity and
the provision of public goods (Alesina et al., 1999; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005a)
while others have emphasized the impact on productivity(Bandiera et al., 2005;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). In a comparison across US counties, it is found that
higher ethnic fractionalisation is associated with a lower rate of collective action
in the communityVigdor (2004). There are also studies that have linked ethnic
fractionalisation and trust and pariticipation in communitiesAlesina and La Ferrara
(2000).
In this study, we analyse the association between ethno-linguistic fractionalization
and risky sexual behavior. It goes beyond the objective of this paper in explaining
the exact mechanisms that lie behind this relationship. However, in this section we
discuss some of the possible mechanisms that might link sexual (risky) behavior and
ethno-linguistic fractionalization.
First, an important role might be played by collective social sanctions. We assume
that an individual’s risky sexual behavior is subject to social sanctions, specially
from own spouse and independently from speciﬁc cultural characteristics of any
community. By risky sexual behavior we mean any kind of sexual encounter that
5is outside own cohabiting partner or husband. The importance of collective punish-
ment or reputational mechanisms in developing countries has been well argued in
economics since the 70s4, especially where there is lack of formal institutions(Greif,
1993). Social sanctions or social exclusions are costly in developing countries and
they are part of constraints people take into account when deviating from social
custom. Moreover, social sanctions based on social exclusion are costly to individ-
uals especially if the proportion of individuals accepting the code of sanction and
willing to exclude is higher. There are already studies that have linked ethnicity and
collective social sanctions. In rural western Kenya, ethnic diversity has been asso-
ciated with fewer recorded community social sanctionsMiguel and Gugerty (2005b).
Hence, one mechanism might be that social sanction due to risky behavior is less
costly in heterogeneous societies rather than homogeneous ones.
Second, the role of information and interaction in a community is crucial for risky
behavior. To be subject to social sanction individuals should be detected as hav-
ing risky sexual behavior. The probability of being detected, having risky sexual
behavior like extramarital relation, is higher in homogeneous societies rather than
in heterogeneous societies. This is because homogeneous societies are more likely
to have the same language, culture and networks making ﬂow of information on
people’s characteristic and behavior easier. Individuals, who want to keep risky sex-
ual behavior secret, might ﬁnd heterogeneous societies more favorable. Furthermore
social interaction provides information about the level of HIV/AIDS at community
level including infectious status and risky behavior of partners(Fiske and Taylor,
1991; Rabin, 1998; Watkins and Schatz, 2001; Entwisle et al., 1996; Kohler et al.,
2001; Behrman et al., 2002)5 . Besides, one of HIV prevention campaigns is: avoid
4Akerlof (1979) has introduced reputation as a constraint where he shows that social customs,
which are disadvantageous to the individual, may nevertheless persist without erosion, if individuals
are sanctioned by loss of reputation for disobedience of the custom.
5Experimental studies have revealed strong inﬂuences of peers on risk assessments, expectations
and beliefs (Fiske and Taylor 1991; Rabin 1998; Watkins and Schatz 2001). Social networks play
an important role in shaping the di usion of innovations in developing countries including the
use of contraceptive (Behrman et al 2002). Moreover, qualitative data from Thailand and Kenya
provide evidence that women chat with each other about family planning and AIDS (Entwisle et
6partners who have multiple partners. This plays an important role on infectious
status of individuals.
Third, economic development might act as a third mechanism. Economic devel-
opment attracts di erent ethnicities from nearby regions through migration and
employment. It also a ects the demand and supply of risky sexual behavior (as
sex is a normal good) for di erent reasons, ranging from commercial sex, leisure,
consumption of alcohol etc..
On the other side, to better understand which of these mecchanisms have a role
on HIV and risky sexual behavior we need to deﬁne ethno-linguistic heterogeneity.
Measuring, and thus deﬁning, ethno-linguistic heterogeneity in sub-Saharan coun-
tries is challenging. The traditional measure based on the Herﬁndahl index, the so
called Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (ELF), is given by the probability that two
randomly drawn individuals from the population belong to two di erent groups. If
we consider a community composed of more than two di erent ethnic groups, with
si being the share of group i over the total population at community level and n
being the total number of ethnicities, then the ELF index would be:
ELF =1 
n  
i=1
s
2
i
Nevertheless, continuous regional migrations and inter-mixing with other groups
suggest ethno-linguistic fractionalization is a function of migration, colonial policy
and intera-group mixing(Alesina et al., 2003).
In some societies there are di erent similarities among di erent ethnic groups which
compose the community. The ELF index gives the same weight to all ethnicities,
while in reality some might have similare cultural values which should be taken into
account without necessarily being equal or completely di erent among each ethnic-
ities. The ELF index attributes a 0 or 1 value to all individuals in the community
al 1996, Kohler et al 2001).
7whether they belong or not to an ethnicity or race. To this purpose, a generalized
index of fractionalization has been proposed in Bossert et al. (2008). With this in-
dicator, the authors propose a matrix of similarity where each individual is a vector
containing similarity values with all other individuals in the community. Similarity
measurment can be various ranging from income, education, language and etc.
As we are studing the e ect of social interactions through ethno-linguistic hetero-
geneity, we ﬁnd this indicator appropriate to our analysis. To compute our indicator
of similarity, we use a matching system of ethnicities on the dataset of couples. In
our hypothesis, if a high proportion of people from ethnicity «x» gets married to
another ethnicity «y» then similarity between these two ethnicities is non zero in
terms of cultural values and networks. To compute similarities between two ethnic-
ities, we take the average between four frequencies: frequency of wife from ethnicity
«x» getting married to husband from ethnicity «y»; frequency of wife from ethnicity
«y» getting married to husband from ethnicity «x»; and similarly for the husband.
To give you some illustration on the indicator we construct, let us consider a comu-
nity with 3 ethnicities. The similarity matrix, S, of couples’ matching based on the
ethnicity of the husband and wife is as follows:
S =
 
     
 
 
1 sx,y sx,z
sy,x 1 sy,z
sz,x sz,y 1
 
     
 
 
where sx,y = sy,x = avg
 
fh
x,y,fh
y,x,fw
x,y,fw
y,x
 
and fh
x,y denotes the proportion of hus-
bands «x» getting married to women of «y» (subscript h stands for husband while w
for wife). The matrix is symmetric and equal to 1 on the diagonals as similarity with
own ethnicity is 1. We construct a similarity matrix as above for each enumeration
area in our dataset. Based on the above matrix, S, the generalized ethno-linguistic
fractionalisation indicator, as proposed in Bossart et al (2008), is as follows:
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1
n2
n  
i=1
n  
j=1
si,j
where i,j  {x,y,z} and si,j is an element of the matrix S.
Another index of diversity which we compute is the Entropy Index (also called the
Shannon index ) used for species to measure biodiversity. The ELF index gives
higher weights to higher proportion of ethnicities as it has a quadratic form while
the Entropy Index (EI) gives a decreasing weight as the proportion of a speciﬁc eth-
nicity increases in a community. It takes a maximum value when all the ethnicities
are equally represented in the community. We compute a normalized EI, between
[0,1] , in each enumeration area:
EI =
 
 n
i=1 siln(si)  
 
(n 1)
2N
 
ln(n)
where si is the proportion of ethnic i in the community, n is the number of ethnicities
in the community and N is the total number of individuals in the community.
We computed ethno-linguistic in each enumeration areas of the population census
by exploiting data at individual level. We compute the ELF, GELF and EI on
ethnicities in each enumeration area. There are a total of 50 ethnicities in Cameroon,
67 in Ethiopia, 15 in Kenya and 9 in Malawi. The correlation between the three
indicators we computed is 0.79 between ELF and GELF, 0.94 between ELF and EI
and 0.75 between GELF and E.
We consider religious fractionalization on a total of 8 di erent religions in Cameroon,
6 in Ethiopia, 5 in Kenya and 8 in Malawi (including those without religion and
those classiﬁed as other). We compute religious fractionalization, based only on the
Herﬁndahl Index to capture any unobserved heterogeneity due to the concentration
of speciﬁc religions that are more likely to be correlated with ethnic fractionalization.
For example, we believe that being a Muslim in the Far North Region of Cameroon,
9where 75% of the population are Muslim, is probably di erent from being a Muslim
in any other region where presence of the religion is much lower.
3 Empirical Strategy and Results
We use DHS household surveys: Cameroon 2004, Ethiopia 2005, Kenya 2003, Malawi
2004. These are surveys conducted in a number of countries beginning from the late
1980s and focusing on fertility, contraception and child health. Lately, the AIDS
Indicator Survey (AIS) has been conducted together with the DHS and questions
about sexual behaviors like extramarital sex, premarital sex, sex within marriage and
their HIV status has been included. There are 9 recent waves of surveys between
2003-2006 that include both ethnicity and AIS. However, we focus on 4 countries
where HIV prevalence is at least 2% at national level. Due to spatial correlation in
HIV prevalence we focus on countries that are broadly comparable.
The number of observations in our sample is 35,933 individuals where women repre-
sent 52.5%. Age of eligible indivuals, for sexual behavior and HIV, ranges between
15-49 for women and 15-59 for men.
In all speciﬁcations we use di erent controls to capture unobserved heterogene-
ity at country/regional/urban/rural/enumeration area level. Other controls based
on socio-economic characteristics at individual level are also included: education,
wealth, age, marital status, religion and proportion of people in the richest and
richer wealth quintile in each enumeration area to capture local economic develop-
ment. We provide summary statistics of these variables in Table 1.
3.1 HIV and Risky Behavior
In our sample, a total of 17% have declared at least one extramarital sex in the
last 12 months with relevant heterogeneity among countries: 34% in Cameroon and
105% in Ethiopia. Out of the total number of men sampled, 25% declared at least
one extramarital sex versus 11% of women, showing that women reported less risky
behavior than men.
There are numerous factors that might inﬂuence individual’s risky sexual behavior:
general individual characteristics (age, education, wealth, marital status, health,
preferences for sexual partners and susceptibility to HIV), social characteristics
(communities’ ethnic or religious identities), knowledge and exposure to HIV/AIDS
and cost of HIV infection and prevention. Our basic model evaluate the impact of
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on risky behavior:
si,c =   +  Hc +  Xi,c +  Dr +  i,c
where si,c is the number of «declared» extramarital relations of individual i in com-
munity c, Hc is ethno-linguistic and religious heterogeneity in the community, Xi,c
is a set of individual control variables in community c and Dr is a set of dummies
at regional level. There are a total of 34 regional dummies based on the deﬁnition
of the DHS survey: 12 in Cameroon, 11 in Ethiopia, 8 in Kenya and 3 in Malawi.
These dummies capture all common cultural and economic factors including re-
gional HIV prevalence, perception and social cost of infection like stigmatization.
The individual control variables are education, wealth, age, marital status, religion.
Table 2 reports results from our ﬁrst Poisson regression of «declared» extramarital
relation on heterogeneity and other control variables. The database includes all
eligible men and women restricted to those enumeration areas with at least ﬁve6 in-
dividuals sampled and 70% of them residents for at least 10 years. This gives us the
possibility to clean the e ect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity due to the presence of
6We restrict to 5 the number of individuals in the enumeration area such that our indicators
of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity are more appropriate. The total number of individuals sampled
in the enumeration area range between 1 and 60. Results are not conditional on the minimum
number of people sampled. However, increasing this number leads to ruling out many rural areas
from our analysis.
11migrants. We ﬁnd a positive signiﬁcant impact of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on
the number of «declared» extramarital relation. It is worth to note that if we further
distinguish by gender, the e ect of ELF on declared risky behavior is driven by the
sample of women and speciﬁcally married women. Married women report higher
number of extramarital sex in heterogenous societies. The association is stronger if
we relax our above restrictions on the sample. Particularly, as you can observe in
Column 1 of Table 2, signiﬁcance clearly emerges if we run our regression on the
whole sample and include a dummy for being a migrant or not, where by migrant
we mean individuals who are resident for less than 10 years.
In Panel B of Table 2, we replicate our analysis on the sample of individuals who
have declared a positive number of extramarital sex. This allows us to rule out
potential endogeneity due to under-reporting. It is quite reasonable that declaring
one or superior extramarital sex is less correlated with under-reporting; given that
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation could be a source for under-reporting, we may look
at Panel B as a further robustness check. Summing up results, the gender related
impact of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity is reinforced. However, a strong limitation
of these regressions is due to the number of oberservation in the restricted sample.
We do not consider individual HIV risk perception explicitly but regional dummy
should capture regional level HIV prevalence. These regional dummies capture also
di erences in ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization between di erent re-
gions, while our community level heterogeneity captures di erences within regions.
For the sake of knowledge, once we controlled for ethno-linguistic heterogeneity we
found no signiﬁcant impact of religious heterogeneity on «declared» extramarital
relations.
The regressions on declared risky behavior are to be taken with caution. Many
studies have underlined that self-reported variables regarding private information
like sexual behavior are not truthfully reported7(Gersovitz et al., 1998; Glynn et al.,
7Glynn et al. (2001) showed that 12% of women who reported being virgins were HIV positive
and some had other sexually transmitted infections.
122001).
To give you more illustration on reported sexual behavior we analyze our data and
show that the number of extramarital sex, declared by both married or cohabiting
men and women, is inconsistent with their recent sexual activity in the last four
weeks. To this purpose, we use the data on couples where information on their
sexual activity in the last 4 weeks and number of extramarital sex in the last 12
months is available both for the husband and wife. In our dataset, we have a total
of interviewed 7,698 couples. Restricting the sample to monogamous couples, in
Table 3 we construct a two-way table for being sexually active in the last 4 weeks.
We show that there are over 1,046 cases where the declaration of sexual activity is
discordant. Indeed, in a monogamous couple, if one declares not to be active in the
last 4 weeks while the partner declares so, then the partner should be more likely
to declare at least one extramarital sex in the last 12 months. In the Table 4, we
compare the above statistics with their extramarital sex in the last 12 months. We
learn that out of 513 cases, where the wife was sexually active and the husband
not, 99% of these women declared 0 extramarital sex in the last 12 months. Ex-
tramarital sex is under-reported for men as well: only 17.5% of them declare at
least one extramarital sex. It is interesting to note that the discordances in recent
sexual activity is, approximately, equally distributed among men and women (533
versus 513). These means that they were both negligent in reporting recent sexual
activity or extramarital sex in the last 12 months, leading to inconsistency. Another
explanation is that both husband and wife under-report extramarital sex.
However, to disentangle this problem, we consider extramarital sex in the last 12
months as «declared» extramarital sex rather than e ective extramarital sex. As
we have mentionned above, our regressions su er from endogeneity due to reporting
biases. Individuals tend to under-report extramarital sex in homogeneous commu-
nities and this creates an upward bias on our variable of interest.
To tackle the problem of endogeneity that may arise, from next section on, we test
13our hypothesis on HIV status of individuals; being HIV a non self-reported variable
and a more objective measurement of risky sexual behavior.
3.2 HIV status and Ethno-linguistic Fractionalisation
Information on the HIV status of individuals is based on voluntary testing and
respondents are not aware of the result. HIV status is reliable information compared
to self-reported variables. However, some individuals have refused to be tested.
Average response rate is higher for women rather than for men. It is also higher in
rural areas rather than urban areas. Overall response rate is more than 70%. By
comparing mean di erences of observable characteristics of women who accepted
to test and those who refused, it seems that women who refused are more likely
to be HIV positive(Juhn et al., 2009)8. This means data on HIV are probably
underestimated. HIV prevalence rate ranges between 1.3% in Ethiopia and 12.3%
in Malawi9. It is higher among women (1.7% in Ethiopia and 13.9% in Malawi)
rather than men and in urban areas rather than in rural areas. We consider HIV
status of both men and women as a function of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. In
this case, we consider the direct and indirect e ect of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity,
through own risky behavior or that of partner’s.
We replicate the above analysis on the probability of being HIV positive. Our model
can be rewritten as follows:
HIVi,c =   +  Hc +  Xi,c +  Dr +  i,c
We are aware that most of the individual characteristics as control variables might
not be completely exogenous. Location in urban or rural areas, education and
8Juhn, Kalemli-Ozcan and Turan (2009) ﬁnd that refusers are more likely to be educated, less
likely to live in rural areas and more likely to be in the wealthiest quintile. This is a similar
pattern which separates HIV positive and HIV negative women implying that HIV prevalence is
underestimated.
9All HIV prevalence rates in this paper are calculated by using the DHS sample weights.
14wealth might be, to some extent, choice variables for the individual or her family.
Fore example, Antiretroviral treatment is not observed and it might create bias if it
is correlated to education, wealth and if living in urban areas. The amount of bias
depends on the proportion of people who were aware of their HIV status and had
the treatment while being surveyed. Endogeneity arises if individuals migrate, due
to their HIV status or ARV treatment, in more heterogeneous areas. We run our
regressions on HIV status on a sample of people who have been living in their place
of residence at least for 10 years and them being at least 70% of the community.
Table 5 report results on the e ect of ELF on HIV status and on HIV prevalence
at enumeration area level. For ease of interpretation, we report OLS regression co-
e cients. An increase of 1 percent in ethno-linguistic heterogeneity increases the
probability of being HIV positive by 0.05 percent. Alternatively, it increases HIV
prevalence rate at enumeration area level by 0.058. The impact is reduced if we add
control variables, but signiﬁcance always holds.
In Table 6, we replicate probit regressions of HIV status on ethno-linguistic het-
erogneity and we di erentiate by gender as previously for declared extramarital sex.
In Column 1, we run the regression for all the sample, obtaining strong signiﬁcance
for ELF and EI indicators. In Column 2, by restricting the sample to enumeration
areas in which the number of people sampled is superior to ﬁve and the proportion of
migrants is less than 30 percent, only the ELF indicator remains signiﬁcant. From
Column (3) to (5), the sample is restricted to women, married and not married
while from column (6) to (8) the sample is restricted to that of men. We obtain
that ethno-linguistic heterogeneity has a positive impact on HIV status of women,
especially if married. The same results cannot be drawn for men.
In Table 7 we report probit regression on all the sample by considering the inter-
action terms between our indicators of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and a dummy
for women; gender related e ect becomes more evident, conﬁrming the above results
in the previous sections.
15To better understand the di erence between the siero-status of men and women, i.e.
due to own behavior or that of partner’s, we are going to concentrate on couples by
analyzing concordant and discordant couples from the next section on.
3.3 Discordant HIV status of Couples and Ethno-linguistic
Fractionalization
In the dataset of couples we consider cases where HIV is discordant, i.e. either the
wife or the husband is siero-positive. Table 8 shows the number of cases where HIV
status is discordant among couples. Out of 7,171 couples interviewed with informa-
tion on their siero-status, 5.5% of them are in a discordant couple. There are a total
of 424 women and 411 men who are HIV positive with married or cohabiting marital
status. A total of 191 women and 171 men are in a discordant status. Discordance
among couples might occur due to risky behavior before or after marriage. It also
depends if the couple is polygamous. It is interesting to note that, approximately,
all HIV positive married women or men are equally divided among concordant and
discordant status. If sample is restricted to monogamous couples, married for a
determinated period of time, HIV discordant cases are good proxies for e ective
extramarital sex.
In Table 9 we report results of our analysis on discordancy. In a ﬁrst moment, we
consider the impact of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity on the probability of being in
a disconcordant couple. The probability of being in a discordant couple measures
approximately risky behavior of both the husband and wife provided that we control
for the period of time the couple is married. In a second moment, we separate the
e ect on discordancy, whether it is the wife or husband who is HIV positive. We
ﬁnd that there is a positive e ect of ethnolinguistic heterogeneity on the probability
of being in a discordant couple and this e ect is stronger for dicordancy when the
wife is HIV positive.
164 Sensitivity Analysis
Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity and public goods provision has been discussed in the
literature through its role on conﬂicts, di erent preferences and tastes(Alesina et al.,
1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005)(Alesina et al., 1999; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000; Alesina et al., 2003; Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2005). In our analysis a possible mechanism, through which ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity a ects HIV status, might be due to public policies or public
good provision at community or regional level. For example, the e ect of ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity on HIV status of an individual might be driven by bad
public health provision or bad prevention campaign due to lack of collective actions.
In light of it, the regional and rural/urban dummies should capture any di erence
in the provision of public policies related to HIV/AIDS epidemics at regional and
urban/rural level.
Moreover, a common characteristic of African countries is the role played by policy
makers in enhancing regional and ethnic favoritism in the allocation of national
government funds or public good provision. Again, the dummies should capture
any potential bias due to ethnic favoritism in addressing goverment funds against
HIV at regional level. As a further control, we replicate our result by controlling
for ethnic ﬁxed e ects rather than regional ﬁxed e ects. Results hold except for the
GELF indicator of ethno-linguistic heterogeneity.
We also check if our result is not lead by migration in a way that the presence of
migrants in an area might a ect ethno-linguistic heterogneity: at the same time
migrants might practice high risk sexual activity with respect to non migrants. To
this purpose we restrict our sample to residents for at least 10 years. Ten years is
the maximum number which allows us to identify those who have contracted the
virus in their actual place of residence.
Finally, we also test if our results are robust compared to urban and rural areas.
17DHS has a comparative deﬁnition of rural and urban areas. This allows us to ensure
that our results are not triggered by di erences between urban and rural areas.
Even population density might be conducive to our results: a proper measure of
population density could be represented by the number of people sampled in the
enumeration area.
We do not report results for these robustness check. However, in any case all these
controls support our ﬁndings10.
5 Conclusion
This paper is based on the most recent nationally representative survey of four
sub-Saharan countries, which are spatially comparable to determine the e ect of
ethno-linguistic fractionalization on HIV epidemics. We ﬁnd a positive association
between heterogeneity and risky sexual behavior of individuals. Our result holds
both for «declared» extramarital sex and HIV status.
Another important ﬁnding of our paper is the gender related e ect of heterogeneity
on HIV. It seems that women’s behavior is more shaped by social heterogeneity
rather than men’s. This holds for «declared» extramarital sex of women, HIV status
and probability of being in a discordant couple where she is HIV positive. The e ect
on «declared» extramarital sex of women could be intuitive to the extent that social
sanction due to declaring risky sexual behavior is more costly for women rather
than men. Conversely, the e ect on HIV status is less intuitive as ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity seems not to a ect men’s siero-status. As the probability of being
detected increases, when engaging in risky sexual behavior due to social homogeneity,
women are less probable to be infected with HIV and ﬁnally less probable to be in
a discordant couple where she is HIV positive. Ethno-linguistic heterogeneity also
a ects risky sexual behavior and HIV status of men; however, men are biologically
10All the tables containing the results are available upon request.
18less exposed to HIV infection rather than women; moreover, higher proportion of
men have refused to be tested and this might under-estimate HIV prevalence among
men. A further explanation of our ﬁnding might be the opportunity that ethno-
linguistic heterogeneity gives to HIV positive women to keep conﬁdentiality on their
status and use strategic behavior with their husband in order not to infect him.
Notwithstanding, it also implies that she is aware of her status.
Pongou (2009) stressed out the role that ethno-linguistic heterogeneity plays on
ﬁdelity and social network formation among couples. We put forward an original
result by emphasizing the di erence between women and men. It is more likely
that, not only an information asymmetry, but also a reputational mechanism plays
a role on women’s behavior. We also disentangle the global e ect of ethno-linguistic
heterogeneity on own status by di erentiating among discordant couples where either
she or he is HIV positive.
Our paper takes account of some characteristics at community level, which are
helpful to address some speciﬁc prevention policies when, for example, Antiretroviral
therapy is provided.
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.
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28ELF -0.00239
(0.00220)
ELF*FEMALE 0.00772***
(0.00219)
EI -0.227
(0.180)
EI*FEMALE 0.564***
(0.175)
GELF -0.00228
(0.00200)
GELF*FEMALE 0.00617***
(0.00206)
FEMALE 0.142* 0.138* 0.172**
(0.0753) (0.0800) (0.0759)
Religeous Fractionalisation -0.00271 -0.00254 -0.00269
(0.00410) (0.00410) (0.00412)
Migrant 0.285*** 0.286*** 0.282***
(0.0653) (0.0651) (0.0655)
Married  -0.267*** -0.268*** -0.277***
(0.0759) (0.0759) (0.0758)
Urban 0.0551 0.0779 0.0770
(0.120) (0.125) (0.131)
Age 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.184***
(0.0213) (0.0213) (0.0213)
Age Squared -0.00247*** -0.00247*** -0.00247***
(0.000316) (0.000314) (0.000314)
Constant -5.262*** -5.264*** -5.288***
(0.501) (0.512) (0.499)
Observations 14739 14739 14739
Table 7: Effecto of Ethno-Linguistic Heterogeneity on HIV status by Gender
Dependent Variable: HIV Status
All regressions include 34 regional fixed effects,Dummy for Christian or Muslim, 
wealth, education. Sample is restricted to those areas where the number of 
people sampled, in the enumeration area is superior to 5, and the proportion of 
migrants in the enumeration area is less than 30%. Results are stronger if we 
relax this restriction. In all regressions, samples weights are used and robust 
standard errors clustered at the enumeration area level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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